Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment program (EPSDT), in order to assess how well major child health goals are being served for low-income children.
Medicaid is the single most important public health program for low-income children, accounting for over 55 percent of all public health expenditures for children, compared to only 25 percent of public health expenditures for the elderly (Budetti, Butler, and McManus 1982) . Medicaid has played a crucial role in reducing the disparity in access to health care between poor and nonpoor children (Davis and Schoen 1978) .
The E P SD T program , added to the Medicaid program in 1967, ensures that all M edicaid-eligible children are covered not only for health care for acute and chronic medical problems but also for a wide range of preventive benefits, including health assessments, immuni zations, vision, hearing and dental care, and medical treatment for episodic or chronic conditions disclosed during the screening process. Thus, the Medicaid program, in both its diagnosis-related and preventive health aspects, contains enormous potential for helping poor children secure access to the full range of health care they need.
However, Medicaid has substantially shortchanged the children it was meant to serve. Even prior to the dramatic 1981 reductions in federal eligibility standards, Medicaid provided only one out of three poor children with full-year coverage and left another one-third of all poor children completely uninsured (Butler et al. 1985) . Despite the broad range o f preventive and primary health services available to M edicaid-eligible children through the EPSD T program, over half of all black preschool children were inadequately immunized against various preventable childhood diseases in 1982 (Children's Defense Fund 1985b) . Poor children continue to be at increased risk of death from all causes, including preventable factors, and are more likely to suffer greater and more severe and prolonged levels of many childhood illnesses (Egbuanu and Starfield 1982) . Finally, when adjusted for health status, poor children have less access to medical care than their nonpoor counterparts (Kleinman 1981) .
This article examines two separate but highly related issues. First, it analyzes M edicaid as a current source of health care financing for children. Second, it evaluates key structural decisions that states have made in im plem enting their EPSD T programs in order to determine whether the states' approach to EPSD T administration is compatible both with the limitations of Medicaid and the needs of low-income children.
W e focus particularly on EPSD T in this article because, as the component of Medicaid devoted exclusively to children, it provides insight into how adequately states finance a range of pediatric medical services for low-income children. Since EPSD T covers both assessment and medical treatment services, examination o f EPSD T can identify how a variety of low-income children's health care service needs are met.
Finally, we conclude this article by exploring a series of possibilities for improving health care financing and service delivery arrangements for poor children.
Children and Medicaid: An Uneasy Relationship
Despite the fact that poor children have a disproportionately large stake in M edicaid, their relationship with the program has never been an easy one. Furthermore, children's link to Medicaid has deteriorated significantly over the last several years as a direct result of major federal restrictions imposed on the program by the Reagan administration and Congress.
Medicaid is a federal grant-in-aid program that entitles certain categories of poor individuals to coverage for a range of medical benefits (Rosenbaum 1983b) . States are granted sizeable flexibility in feshioning their Medicaid plans. However, as a condition of participation in the program, states m ust cover certain groups of persons and must provide certain benefits to enrollees.
Payments for covered services are made directly by state Medicaid agencies to providers participating in the program for care furnished to enrollees. States maintain considerable flexibility in developing provider-participation standards, and establishing reimbursement rates, particularly in the case o f outpatient services.
The federal government reimburses states for a certain percentage o f the costs Medicaid agencies incur. The federal reimbursement level is based on a formula tied to a state's per capita income level. ^ While 445 federal funding for Medicaid is open-ended, as a practical matter a state will budget a set amount for a Medicaid program of a certain size and will control amounts expended by lim iting the categories of persons served, restricting the definition of who is " poor" enough to qualify for M edicaid, lim iting the range and depth of coverage, and limiting the level of reimbursement paid to providers. For example, in 1985 Medicaid financial eligibility levels for a family of three with no other income ranged from $118 per month in Alabama to $719 per month in Alaska.
Medicaid is the largest and most complex of all need-based federal grant-in-aid programs. Basically, however, it is an entitlement program that generally " piggybacks" onto two cash-assistance programs for the poor, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)^ and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)^ programs. The SSI program is a federally financed welfare program providing cash grants to aged, blind, and certain disabled persons, and its categorical and financial eligibility requirements are set by federal law. AFDC, on the other hand, is a federal grant-in-aid program that provides states with near total flexibility to establish financial eligibility criteria. In 1985 a single, noninstitutionalized SSI recipient received a living allowance of $336 per month in addition to Medicaid coverage.
That same year, however, the average AFDC benefit for a family of three was approximately $340 per month, or a prorated amount of approximately $113 per month for each family member. As table 1 records, the 1985 monthly A FD C cash payment levels for a family of three were extraordinarily low.
The A FD C program represents the major test by which children's financial eligibility for Medicaid is determined. Over 95 percent of the more than 10 m illion children who received Medicaid in fiscal year 1984 were eligible as " dependent children." These children were covered by M edicaid either because they received AFDC or because they lived in families with countable incomes at or below AFDC payment levels (Health Care Financing Administration 1984a). Eightyfour percent o f all children classified as " dependent" also received an AFDC cash grant. Another portion lived in families whose total " 4 2 U .S .C . sect. 6 0 1 , et. seq. (1 9 8 5 ). M 2 U .S .C . sect. 1 6 0 1 , et. seq. (1 9 8 5 ). 327  44  Florida  240  33  Georgia  223  30  Hawaii  468  63  Idaho  304  41  Illinois  302  41  Indiana  256  35  Iowa  360  49  Kansas  365  49  Kentucky  197  27  Louisiana  190  26  Maine  370  50  Maryland  313  42  Massachusetts  396  54  Michigan  372  50  Minnesota  524  71  Mississippi  120  16  Missouri  27 3  37  Montana  3 32  45  Nebraska  350  47  Nevada  285 Source: Social Security A dm inistration, O ctober, 1985: Data based on typical state maximum A FD C paym ents. * Reflects categorically needy eligibility only for 1985 for families with no other income. M edically needy eligib ility levels may be slightly higher in those states in which the actual A FD C paym ent am ount is lower than A FD C payment standard. * * For 1985, annual federal poverty guidelines set poverty income levels for a family of 3 at S 8 ,8 5 0 ($ 7 3 7 .5 0 per month).
incomes were at or below AFD C eligibility levels. About one million children were enrolled in Medicaid because, after incurred medical expenses were deducted, their families had countable incomes between 100 percent and 133 percent of their state's AFDC payment level (Health Care Financing Administration 1984a) . Such recipients are known as the " medically needy'' (Rosenbaum 1983b ). Only about a quarter million children received Medicaid on the basis of SSI eligibility.
Thus, insofar as financial eligibility is concerned, AFDC is the determinant of children's eligibility for Medicaid. Federal law mandates coverage for all poor children under age five whose families are cat egorically ineligible for AFDC. Federal law also provides state Medicaid programs the option o f covering any child under age 21 whose family does not meet A FD C categorical eligibility standards. Thirty states have exercised this option (table 2) . But even for children who are categorically ineligible for A FD C cash assistance, the AFDC program nonetheless provides the financial test by which their eligibility is measured.
Obviously, a program that incorporates financial eligibility criteria as restrictive as those found in the states' AFDC programs will result in the denial of aid to millions of extremely poor children. For example, were an A FD C recipient with two children to find full time, m inim um wage employment, her gross salary of about $575 per month, which equals two-thirds of the federal poverty level for a family o f three, would give her a monthly income level greater than the 1985 A FD C payment level for a family of three in every state but Alaska (table 1). Even her take-home pay, which would be somewhat lower (the federal tax system unfortunately taxes poor as well as nonpoor workers), would still exceed nearly all states' monthly AFDC payment levels. Her gross salary would also have exceeded the socalled "standard of need" in 30 states (Children's Defense Fund 1986b). The " standard o f need" is the threshold point for determining AFDC and M edicaid eligibility for applicants with outside income.
De m inim us A FD C financial eligibility standards thus result in a built-in bias against Medicaid coverage of poor workers and their families. Prior to 1981, only 12 percent of states' AFDC caseloads included persons with earned income, and " excess" earnings, meager as they m ight be, have traditionally been one of the primary reasons why a family loses its A FD C coverage (Congressional Research Service 1985) .
The traditional bias in public assistance programs against poor working families is particularly disturbing since two-thirds of all poor children in 1984 lived in families in which at least one member was in the labor force (Children's Defense Fund 1986a) and since firms that primarily employ m inim um wage earners are likely to offer no health insurance as a fringe benefit (Monheit et al. 1984) . Not sur prisingly, it has been estimated that three-quarters of uninsured Amer icans are either in the labor force (and disproportionately working at lower-wage jobs) or are dependents for persons in the labor force (Monheit et al. 1984) . In 1980 poor children were over 3 times more likely than nonpoor children to be completely uninsured and only 33 percent o f poor children had any private insurance coverage that year (Butler et al. 1985) .
Since 1980 the limitations on children's Medicaid eligibility have been intensified by a series of congressional actions undertaken as part of the Reagan adm inistration's fiscal year 1982 budget proposals. These proposals, which established new, mandatory federal limits on AFD C coverage for families with outside income were specifically designed to remove the working poor from the program. These lim itations, which automatically apply to Medicaid, include the following:
• Prior to 1981 a working AFDC recipient had all necessary workrelated expenses deducted from his earnings in calculating his or her eligibility for benefits. Since enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA)^, states can now deduct only $75 of an individual's work-related costs each month, regardless of a worker's actual expenses.
• Prior to 1981 a worker could deduct all child care costs in applying for AFD C. O B R A limited the child care deduction to $160 per month, even for full-time workers.
• Prior to 1981 a set portion of a worker's wages were discounted, ' P .L . 9 7 -3 5 (1 9 8 1 ).
for as long as he or she worked, in computing his or her entitlement to A FD C benefits. After O B R A that portion of earned income could be disregarded only for a limited period of time.
• Prior to 1981 workers could apply for and receive AFDC and Medicaid no m atter how high their gross earnings, so long as their countable earnings fell below payment eligibility levels. After O B R A a worker with gross earnings in excess of 150 percent of a state's "standard of need" could not even be considered for benefits, no matter how much his or her earnings m ight be reduced by work-related expenses.
• O B R A tightened the federal A FD C asset test from $2,000 to $ 1 ,0 0 0 , thereby elim inating from coverage persons with more than $ 1 ,0 0 0 in personal resources.
In 1984, Congress softened some of these 1981 penalties.^ First, the 150 percent "cap " on the "standard of need" was raised to 185 percent. Second, the period of time during which an AFDC-eligible worker could be credited with "disregards" earnings was slightly lengthened. Third, states were required to extend Medicaid for nine months for workers who lost coverage simply because certain AFDC disregards earnings expired (states were also given the option to extend this coverage for an additional six months).
However, these modifications by no means restored A FD C's (and thus, M edicaid's) federal eligibility standards to modest, pre-1981 levels. As a result, m illions of poor workers who previously might have been assisted by the A FD C and Medicaid programs now fail to qualify for benefits.
The cumulative effects o f the AFD C program's long-term financial stagnation and the federally imposed antiwork restrictions enacted in 1981 have been to lim it severely the amount of time that a child's family can be expected to qualify for Medicaid (assuming that they can any longer qualify at all). Indeed, so severely have welfare stagnation and federal restrictions cut into children's Medicaid eligibility that had state Medicaid programs in 1983 performed at their 1976 eligibilitŷ Sect. 2 6 2 4 o f the D eficit R edu ction A ct o f 1984 (P .L . 9 6 -3 6 9 ) . levels, two million additional children would have qualified for coverage that year (Children's Defense Fund 1985a). Moreover, in great measure because of fluctuating income, about one-third o f all AFDC recipients lose eligibility within one year, and 50 percent lose eligibility within two years (McManus 1986) .
Poor families with fluctuating earnings are extremely likely to be swept off the program for one or more reasons. A specialized study of the effects of the 1981 A FD C reductions found that, in five major cities surveyed, 66 to 86 percent o f working AFDC recipients were affected by the reductions, compared to only 4 to 15 percent of those without earnings (U .S. General Accounting Office 1985). Among the employed, between 36 and 60 percent lost benefits outright. A year later half of these families had no health insurance. These five cities experienced approximately a two-thirds decline in the already low percentage of A FD C recipient families who had any earned income.
There can be no doubt as to M edicaid's impact on low-income children's access to and utilization o f health care. One out of every three low-income children under the age o f 6 with full-year Medicaid coverage, compared to one out of five uninsured low-income children received any preventive health services in 1980. Furthermore, adjusted for health status, low-income uninsured children were significantly less likely to see a physician for any reason that year than Medicaidcovered children (Rosenbach 1985) .
Thus, the most important public health financing program for poor children offers them increasingly attenuated coverage for services. Children in poor families, particularly families that work, may be eligible for Medicaid for a few months, if at all, only to lose coverage because of a slight increase in the otherwise-uninsured family head's earnings.
Thirty-five states do provide Medicaid to medically needy children whose family incomes slightly exceed AFDC eligibility levels but are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical care (table 2) . But these programs are of extremely limited usefulness. Like the basic Medicaid program, states' "medically needy" programs are tied to the A FD C payment level. Children living in minimum wage families would have to incur significant medical costs before their eligibility could begin-costs that in many instances far exceed the cost of a child's routine preventive and episodic health care needs. With these words, President Johnson transmitted to Congress the Social Security Amendments of 1967, containing certain " Recom mendations for the Welfare of Children." These recommendations included a series o f amendments to Medicaid and Crippled Children's programs^ that were intended " to discover, as early as possible, the ills that handicap our children" and to provide "continuing followup and treatment so that handicaps do not go neglected." By the end of that year, after remarkably brief consideration. Congress had amended both statutes to include a new required service for all individuals under the age o f 21 and eligible for Medicaid. This benefit was known as Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT). ^ Thus, one of the most sweeping health guarantees for disadvantaged American children ever enacted by Congress was launched: a program that would locate children suffering from health problems and ensure that they received the continuous and comprehensive medical care they needed. Congress envisioned that working together, crippled children's agencies and other public agencies would identify children in need of care and would extend to them a program of preventive and remedial health benefits. The Medicaid program would finance the cost of the medical and remedial care provided by these agencieŝ
The Crippled Children's Program was originally codified as a separate authority within the Social Security A ct. In 1967, however, it was consolidated with the M aternal and C h ild H ealth P rogram as T itle V o f the Social Security A ct, 42 U .S .C . sect. 7 0 1 , et. seq. In 1981 T itle V was expanded to include a series o f previously categorical m aternal and child health services program s including the T itle V M aternal and C h ild H ealth and C rippled C h ildren's Program s, and renam ed the M aternal and C hild H ealth Block G rant (P .L . to M edicaid-eligible children.^ Ultim ately, Medicaid agencies would also themselves become responsible for case-finding and supportive activities in addition to financing medical care.Â s a required benefit for Medicaid beneficiaries under age 21, EPSD T finances a broad range of primary and preventive health services for children. The purposes of EPSD T are to provide a comprehensive and periodic assessment of a child's overall health, developmental, and nutritional status, to treat conditions and illnesses disclosed during the assessment process, and to provide vision, dental, and hearing care. Services contained in the EPSD T benefit package include: a detailed and comprehensive health examination that consists of a health and developmental history, an unclothed physical examination, ap propriate vision and hearing testing, appropriate laboratory tests, and a direct referral to a dentist for children over the age of three; im munizations; vision, hearing, and dental care; and diagnostic and medical treatment for conditions disclosed during the screening process, to the extent that such treatment services are otherwise included in a state's general Medicaid plan. Moreover, at their discretion, states may furnish special diagnostic and treatment services to children participating in the EPSD T program that are not otherwise made available to M edicaid-eligible persons.
®S. R ep . 7 4 4 to accom pany H .R . 12080, the Social Security Amendments o f 1967. T h e affirm ative action requirem ent o f the M edicaid E P S D T program was origin ally added to the Social Security A ct in 19"* 2 in response to growing congressional concern over states' failure to im plem ent E P S D T . The original provision w ithheld 1 percent o f federal A F D C paym ents from any state that failed to inform , screen, and treat eligib le children, 42 U .S .C . sect. 602(g) (1 9 7 2 ). In 1981 this so-called A F D C " penalty" provision was removed and the M edicaid statu te was am ended to incorporate these affirmative action provisions as a state plan requirem ent, sect. 218 1 o f P .L . 9 7 -3 5 , 95 Stat. 357 (1 9 8 1 ), codified at 42 U .S .C . sect. 1396(a)(44) (1 9 8 2 ).^4 2 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .5 6 (b ) and (c) (1 9 8 6 ).
" 4 2 C .F .R . sect. 441.57 (1 9 8 5 ). T he originally proposed E P S D T regulations w ould have required states to provide all m edically necessary diagnostic and treatm ent services for conditions disclosed du rin g the screening process, even if such services were not included in the state 's basic m edical plan. After intense opposition by states to this rule, however, the N ixon administration chose to lim it the E P S D T enriched services package to vision, dental, and hearing treatm ent only, despite the fact that the statu te itse lf contains no such lim itation .
EPSD T assessment services must be furnished at periodic intervals specified in the state Medicaid plan (known as a periodicity schedule) that meet reasonable standards of medical care^^ (table 3) . Thus, for example, a reasonable EPSD T dental examination schedule would at a minimum call for annual exams and treatm ent/^ Furthermore, each screening exam must meet reasonable content standards. For example, all laboratory tests and developmental assessments must be ageappropriate.
In addition to furnishing this package of basic medical services, state Medicaid agencies m ust also take affirmative action to ensure that EPSD T-eligible children know about, and are able to utilize, the benefits to which they are entitled. These affirmative action re quirements include " effective" programs for informing families about EPSDT that combine oral and written informing procedures;provision of necessary scheduling and transportation assistance for both screening and treatment s e r v ic e s a r r a n g in g for free or reduced-cost care for health services a child needs that are not covered by Medicaid; and the development of interagency agreements with agencies funded under the Title V Maternal and Child Health Block Grant and other agencies and institutions to ensure adequate screening, diagnostic, and treatment providers.
The EPSD T program 's successes and failures have been extensively reviewed during the two decades since its enactment. The program has assisted millions of children who otherwise might never have received comprehensive basic preventive health care. Children have received immunizations, eye exams, hearing tests, and dental care; and countless previously undiagnosed conditions have been disclosed and treated. E P SD T has contributed to a significant improvement in '" 42 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .5 8 (1 9 8 5 ).
M itchell V . Johnston 701 F2d 337 (5th C ir. 1983) holding that the Texas E P SD T dental p ro g ram , which used a dental exam ination schedule that called for routine dental exam s only once every three years was unreasonable, not in accordance w ith accepted professional standards o f practice and therefore in violation o f federal M edicaid and E P S D T regulations. 'M 2 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .5 8 (1 9 8 5 ). " 4 2 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .5 6 (a ) (1 9 8 5 ). '^' 42 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .6 2 (1 9 8 5 ). 'M 2 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .8 5 (1 9 8 5 ). '" 4 2 C .F .R . sect. 4 4 1 .8 5 (1 9 8 5 ). the health status of low-income children served by the program, and specialized studies have demonstrated its effectiveness and cost-effec tiveness (Keller 1983; Irwin and Conroy-Hughes 1982) .
At the same tim e, however, the program has faced serious problems. These problems have been extensively investigated by researchers (Foltz 1975; Children's Defense Fund 1977 A number of researchers have pointed to various factors that impeded effective program implementation, including: the ambiguous nature of federal EPSD T directives and the ensuing confusion they have generated; the poor design of EPSD T programs at the state and local level that has resulted in ineffective implementation; and a general lack of political commitment on the part of many state officials to the program 's aims (Foltz 1975; Children's Defense Fund 1977) .
W hile these are all certainly important considerations in assessing the success o f E PSD T, perhaps the single most important factor is the fact that, since E PSD T is a Medicaid benefit, its effectiveness rests upon children being eligible for Medicaid or an equivalent financing source (such as the Crippled Children's program) that incorporates all o f the E P SD T standards and protocols. If there is no funding, then regardless o f how committed or creative a program administrator is or how clear the federal directives, there will be no way to purchase the preventive, primary, and follow-up screening, diagnostic, and treatment services children need. Ultimately, Medicaid's failure to insure more than one-third of poor children for even a full year (Butler et al. 1985) is the greatest single impediment to achieving EPSDT's goals.
EPSD T has always been dependent upon the success of Medicaid. But the m agnitude of the Medicaid program's shortcomings in 1986 undoubtedly was never envisioned by the drafters of the 1967 child health amendments. Indeed, the complete text of the 1967 Social Security Amendments (of which EPSD T was only a small part) and their legislative history suggest an assumption on the part of Congress and the president that AFD C (and therefore, Medicaid) eligibility standards would remain relatively reasonable.
For example, the 1967 Social Security Amendments placed a ceiling on eligibility levels for state medically needy programs equal to 133 percent of the AFDC payment standard.'^ In 1967 state AFDC payment levels were approximately the same as those used under programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. Thus, the medically needy elderly Sect. 238 of P.L. 90-248.
would be left no worse off, and potentially slightly better off, than those elderly persons who received both cash and medical assistance.
Currently, however, most state AFDC payment levels are dramatically below the payment level under SSI (which was enacted in 1972 to replace prior, less generous state grant-in-aid programs for the aged, blind, and disabled). This discrepancy between AFDC and SSI has led to the anomalous situation in which medically needy eligibility levels for the elderly are significantly below those standards used to qualify the elderly for SSI. Elderly persons who receive welfare are often financially better off than medically needy elderly persons who do not receive cash assistance but who do need medical assistance to meet the high cost o f health care. It is highly doubtful that the Congress would ever have used state AFDC payment standards to determine financial eligibility for the medically needy aged, had it anticipated how far behind cash assistance programs for the aged state AFDC benefits would ultim ately fall.
State Response to EPSDT
Given poor children's tenuous insured status under the Medicaid program, the obvious question which arises is how can a state structure an effective E P SD T program that provides children with continuous access to the range o f benefits EPSD T pays for if Medicaid itself is such an inadequate source o f financing. Addressing children's volatile health financing dilem m a is essential to E P SD T 's success, not only because their uninsuredness frequently prevents them from securing EPSDT and other services, but also because low-income children who are not insured are less likely to receive preventive benefits at all (Rosenbach 1985) . Medicaid has been shown to result in a greater use of preventive services and generally greater access to medical care (Rosenbach 1985) .
Thus, for states to achieve E P SD T 's objectives, as well as the broader goals of child health care, they must first stabilize poor children's health care financing arrangements. Low-income families who have health care coverage for their children on a continuous basis may prove to be more effective health care purchasers, and appropriate health outcomes for these children can be better assured.
During the summer of 1985, the Children's Defense Fund conducted a 50-state survey of EPSD T programs on a range of issues. A survey instrument was prepared to achieve the objectives of the study, which were to determine:
• the extent to which states are in compliance with basic program requirements; • what program changes, if any, had been put into place as a result o f changes in the federal regulations; • if states have developed innovative programs, particularly in the areas o f outreach, provider participation, and case management; and • how effectively states were integrating various health care programs for low-income children.
The questionnaire was pretested and then administered by telephone. In all, more than 50 specific program-related questions were asked o f each state, and an attem pt was made in each case to speak with the EPSD T program coordinator. Follow-up materials, including a sample o f participation data, provider protocols and agreements, pe riodicity schedules, and outreach materials were requested by mail and received from most states. Additional information was obtained from the E PSD T Program Report, for fiscal year 1984 prepared by the Health Care Financing Administration, U. S. Department of Health and Hum an Services.
Several findings from this survey bear specifically on the issue of how adequately states have overcome Medicaid's financing dilemma for children and how adequately state supplemental financing mechanisms are integrated with the EPSD T program. Specifically, we sought information regarding the following: first, how many states have developed sources o f funding to supplement Medicaid when a child in need o f E PSD T screening, diagnostic, and treatment services is ineligible, or no longer eligible, for Medicaid coverage; and second, whether or not the EPSDT screening, diagnostic, and treatment protocols are incorporated into supplemental funding sources.
Su pplem en tal E P S D T F u n d in g f o r C h ild re n Who A re Ineligible fo r M e d ic a id
Our study revealed that no state has a uniform, statewide supplemental funding program to finance the range of EPSD T screening, diagnostic, and treatment services for low-income children who are ineligible for 4 6 1 Medicaid. Nearly all states use some portion of the funds they receive from the federal government under the Title V Maternal and Child Health Block Grant Act to underwrite health screening activities for children through local health departments, although it is not uncommon for such screening programs to be limited to very young children. Moreover, there is no guarantee that even early childhood screening services are uniformly available throughout the state.
Supplemental state funding for treatment services for Medicaidineligible children (vision, dental, and hearing care and treatment for conditions disclosed through the assessment process) is almost non existent. Treatment services for certain problems may be available through T itle V-funded Children and Youth (C&Y) projects (special comprehensive health clinics serving children and funded under the Maternal and Child Health Block Grant), but in no state are C&Y projects available statewide.
Other sources of funding for medical treatment for children who are Medicaid-ineligible include state Crippled Children s (CC) programs, also funded through the Maternal and Child Health Block Grant. In 1983, however, state CC programs served only 620,000 children nationwide for selected medical problems, usually chronic and organic in nature (Association of State and Territorial Health Officials Foundation 1985) . Crippled Children's programs are not commonly a source of funding for children's routine medical care needs, such as vision, hearing, and dental care. Furthermore, many state programs categorically exclude certain conditions, such as mental health problems, as treatable conditions.
Other residual sources o f comprehensive health care for low-income children include Community and M igrant Health Centers. These centers provide a range of primary health services in the areas in which they are located. Nearly 40 percent of all center users are children, an indication o f their poverty and uninsuredness (National Association of Community Health Centers 1986). However, in 1985 the centers served only 5 m illion people, while 20 million more were unserved (National Association of Community Health Centers 1986).
In short, states do not have comprehensive supplemental health care financing arrangements for Medicaid-ineligible low-income children which can be used to advance E P SD T 's goals. At any given time.
'Sects. 330 and 329 of the Public Health Service Act, respectively. one-third of America's 12.9 million poor children are completely ineligible for EPSD T benefits, while another third will have Medicaid coverage for less than one year (Butler et al. 1985) . Implementing a program whose main thrust is providing access to long-term preventive services in such a context is virtually impossible. E PSD T's incompatibility with Medicaid takes on ironic overtones, given policy makers' expectations for the program. In 1984 the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services issued EPSDT regulations that encouraged states to develop EPSD T programs that utilized the services of providers who could provide "continuing care''-that is, both preventive services and medical treatment for periodic, episodic, or chronic health care needs-to Medicaid-eligible children. The goal embodied in this rule o f incorporating EPSDT services with com prehensive health care arrangements for children is certainly a laudable one. However, it is doubtful that "continuing care'' arrangements of reasonable duration can be successfully developed if there is no way to finance a child's care over long periods of time.
Given the problems inherent in implementing "continuing care'' programs for such poorly financed children, we were interested in discovering what actions the states had, in fact, taken to develop arrangements. Our findings indicate that while some states were pursuing continuing care arrangements, none had tied such programs to sup plemental funding sources. Instead, the states appeared to be entering into " continuing care'' agreements as part of an overall effort to enroll Medicaid recipients in specialized primary care case-management ar rangements, authorized under the Medicaid Act in 1981.
The primary purpose of these arrangements is to reduce state Medicaid expenditures, not to provide supplemental financing for poor families. O f 49 states responding to this survey question, 19 reported developing formal continuing care initiatives. However, none of these initiatives reported the inclusion of supplemental funding mechanisms that could be triggered to retain a child's enrollment in the continuing-care program if his or her Medicaid eligibility ceased. Some states are recruiting into their continuing-care programs publicly funded providers with a legal obligation to serve the poor (such as Community Health Centers, Children & Youth projects, or public hospital outpatient clinics). In this way, children who lose Medicaid might continue to remain with the provider on a subsidized basis. However, in most states, enrollment in private physician arrangements is emphasized. adequate job of integrating its services with existing public health efforts, including Community Health Centers, school health programs, family planning clinics, and clinics providing general maternal and child health services, including supplemental food programs for women, infants, and children. Indeed, direct recruitment efforts by the Medicaid agency had been almost entirely limited to individual practitioners in private practice, rather than comprehensive, local agencies that could serve as a continuing-care provider's entity for uninsured poor children. The report recommended that integrated arrangements be developed with public health providers already furnishing health services to poor children in order to expand EPSD T 's delivery system and to reach low-income children in their predominant health care entry points (Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare 1985) .
A p p lic a tio n o f E P S D T S ta n d a rd s to A l l Supplem ental F u n din g Program s
N o state provides supplemental funding for all EPSDT services. However, all states do underwrite at least some screening, diagnostic, or treatment services to M edicaid-ineligible children, either through their Maternal and Child Health Block Grant programs or other state-funded efforts. W e, therefore, sought to determine how many states apply EPSDT assessment standards and protocols to all public programs.
Use of common standards would better assure the provision of health exams that include all of the elements outlined in the EPSDT rules. Common standards would also ensure that children participating in any publicly funded program are recalled for periodic exams in a consistent fashion and that common immunization schedules are used. Moreover, states would be better assured that children receiving any publicly subsidized health services throughout a year are receiving the medical care and services that Medicaid agencies are legally obligated to provide. Finally, providers delivering pediatric services in several different public programs would be guided by a single, standard set of protocols.
Our survey revealed, however, that rather than using EPSDT standards to unify and guide the range of publicly funded pediatric programs, state Medicaid agencies in fact have seriously diluted the EPSDT program by perm itting pediatric providers to claim Medicaid reim bursement for child health exams that may fall short of the content and frequency requirements of the EPSD T program. Moreover, only a few states apply the EPSD T protocols to all publicly paid programs, such as Title V-funded well-child examination services furnished by local health departments.
We have termed these informal Medicaid provider-reimbursement arrangements that bypass the rigorous EPSD T requirements " shadow program s." In general, Medicaid agencies believe that children treated under these " shadow program s" are receiving care equivalent to that required under EPSD T and can, therefore, be considered to be enrolled in " continuing care" arrangements. However, adherance to EPSD T protocols is not a prerequisite to reimbursement of these "equivalent" providers. Thus, the states, in fact, have no way of ensuring that complete assessment and referral services have been furnished.
Without adherence to the articulated standards and detailed protocols embodied in E PSD T, the states have no means of verifying that "shadow" care provided to children is, in fact, equivalent to that furnished under EPSD T. Among the 44 states responding to our question regarding whether EPSD T standards apply to all primary pediatric care reimbursed by Medicaid, most explicitly permit "shadow" billing arrangements. Furthermore, in most states, these " shadow" billing arrangements are available only to private physicians. Evidently, rather than negotiating with private physicians to implement the full EPSDT screening package (the federal regulations for which are based on the American Academy o f Pediatrics Guidelines fo r Health Supervision) states have instead perm itted physicians to bill for routine pediatric health services outside the EPSD T program. In return, Medicaid agencies frequently pay somewhat less for a routine " shadow" health exam than they pay for the full EPSD T complement of services.
We suspect that " shadow" billing is tolerated if not explicitly permitted in almost every state, since it may not be uncommon for a physician to perform a " well-child" exam on a child who is being seen for diagnosis-related reasons. Thus, even states that do not expressly and separately reimburse providers for routine health " shadow" services may, in fact, allow such reimbursement if it is part of an otherwise diagnosis-related visit.
Several adverse effects flow from " shadow" programs. First, health exams may not meet the EPSD T program's quality and content protocols. For example, many state E PSD T screening protocols, in implementing the federal rules' requirement of an age-appropriate hearing exam. An even more serious example involves conditions particularly threatening to poor children, such as lead poisoning. In A Guide to Adm inistration, D iagnosis a n d Treatment, E P S D T , th e U . S. Department of Health, Education, and W elfare, in cooperation with the American Academy of Pediatrics, specifically noted that:
In the United States, 2.5 million children 1 through 5 years of age are at risk o f undue lead absorption. Approximately 600,000 will be affected by the disease, generally as a result of living in old, deteriorated housing containing lead-based paint. Prevalence is lower in suburban areas and may be extremely low in areas with houses built after the 1950s and with little exposure to industrial sources o f lead. Classical symptomatic lead poisoning is generally not seen. Approxim ately 6 ,0 0 0 will develop neurologic damage including slow learning, hyperactivity, and behavioral disorders even though the child is asymptomatic (H SM 110-73-524).
Federal EPSD T assessment guidelines specifically call for lead poisoning testing as part of the basic exam. Yet, many physicians do not incorporate lead testing as part o f their routine office practices. As a result, many children being seen by " shadow" providers may not be tested for lead poisoning.
A particularly serious problem has resulted in New York City, where plaintiffs, suing the city over its failure to identify and treat infants and children suffering from lead poisoning discovered that of all Medicaid-enrolled children in the city, only 5 percent could be certified as having received a full complement of EPSD T services, including lead poisoning exams.With respect to the other 95 percent of M edicaid-eligible children, the city defendant noted that nearly all were under the care of an " equivalent" provider and were, therefore, not in need o f E P SD T screens. However, according to affidavits of medical experts subm itted in the case, it is not common practice outside o f the E P SD T program for a physician in New York City to screen a child for lead poisoning. Therefore, because the state has failed to require adherence to the EPSD T protocol by all providers furnishing preventive Medicaid services to children, children potentially suffering from the effects of lead poisoning may be going unidentified and untreated. Poisoning et al. 185, S .D .N .Y ., 1985) .
New York City Coalition to End Lead
V. Koch (no. 42780 Second, the use of " shadow" programs means that states cannot assure that all children are up-to-date with respect to health exams and immunizations in accordance with state periodicity schedules. Federal E P SD T regulations require that all states establish schedules that identify the ages at which children should be screened and the screening and treatment services (such as developmental assessments, dental care referrals, and immunizations) that are to be provided at each periodic interval (table 3) . However, " shadow" providers, who are not bound by state periodicity schedules may follow individual schedules that call for screening at greater or closer intervals than those called for in the official state periodicity schedule. This practice may, in turn, lead to overutilization or underutilization of needed services.
A third implication o f perm itting " shadow" billing is the potential for poor quality care. For example, health experts emphasize that pediatric practitioners should not attempt to measure a child's overall health and development when the child is being seen for an acute or episodic illness, since a child's responsiveness and capabilities may be depressed as a result o f illness. Moreover, experts also underscore the point that immunizations should not be provided when a child is ill. Since these practices constitute poor medical care, a reasonable EPSDT program by law would not permit reimbursement for an EPSDT exam conducted on a sick child. Yet, these practices might occur under " shadow" program s, which, by definition, fail to regulate provider practices.
A final problem created by the existence of a "shadow" program is its spillover effect on other agencies. A health department may have no real incentive to conform its provider standards for nonMedicaid pediatric programs to those used by the Medicaid agency, if the Medicaid agency itself does not require adherence to rigorous protocols by all pediatric providers furnishing primary care and par ticipating in Medicaid.
The problems created by the widespread use of "shadow" programs are complicated by the fact that not all states have developed detailed standards of practice even for providers willing to participate in the formal EPSDT program. In keeping with the tendency toward "shadow" billing, those that do maintain formal EPSD T protocols will frequently apply them only to selected groups of providers. O f the 45 states responding to our questions on provider standards, only 40 had developed provider standards that are to be used by all providers certified as formal EPSD T practitioners. Six states reported using no provider protocols at all.
Furthermore, of the 40 states using EPSDT provider protocols, 2 exempted private EPSDT providers from having to follow the protocols, even though health departments were required to follow written stan dards. Finally, the level of quality and detail in protocols varied greatly. For some states an extensive manual has been prepared; in others the standards may not include the full screening package. At least 5 of the 40 states are using only a claims form as a protocol, leaving the provider the discretion to interpret the requirements for which no details were provided. For example, officials in Maine repon that they rely on physicians' judgments about the most appropriate manner in which to provide an EPSD T screen. Similarly, although the Texas agency requires all providers to use written protocols for the medical portion of the screen, it has developed no protocol for the dental exam.
In W yoming and several other states, the claims form is the only written EPSD T guideline supplied to providers. The form is a single column listing beside which a provider m ight check off items such as " family health history/parents" or "physical exam ination/hearing." Such a form, while useful for determining the completeness of a provider s screen, does not tell the provider that an EPSD T hearing screen is to be conducted to certain specifications, such as with an audiometer.
Conclusion
Achieving the goals of high-quality health care for low-income children requires both adequate financing and adherence to sound standards of practice. The M edicaid program with its broad range of preventive, diagnosis and treatment-related services, and its open-ended financing mechanism, represents a powerful tool to reduce significantly un insuredness and improve access among children. However, Medicaid suffers from serious lim itations, some federally imposed and some created by the states. Years o f stagnation in AFD C, whose eligibility methodology is used to determine nearly all children's eligibility for Medicaid, have seriously limited the program's reach. These limitations have been exacerbated since 1981 by federal restrictions designed to remove from Medicaid working-poor families who are least likely to be privately insured.
In recent years state and federal government response to Medicaid and children has been mixed. On the one hand, since 1980 about a dozen states have expanded categorical coverage of children under Medicaid to include all children under age 18 in families satisfying AFDC income and resources criteria. Another six have added coverage for "medically needy" children. Similarly, in 1984, Congress mandated Medicaid coverage o f all children under age five whose families meet state AFDC financial eligibility standards; additionally, Congress softened somewhat the antiwork amendments incorporated into AFDC and Medicaid in 1981. All of these actions are particularly notable in an era of great fiscal constraint.
On the other hand, the financial criteria used to determine children's Medicaid eligibility remain extraordinarily depressed, and punitive measures against the working poor have permanently disinsured millions of families from Medicaid. These highly restrictive eligibility conditions seriously undercut M edicaid's utility as a direct and stable insurer of poor children, thereby rendering such crucial programs as EPSDT far less useful than they m ight otherwise be. EPSD T 's utility is further undercut by apparent state dilution of this all-important benefit. W e believe that two things must happen. First, the states must develop better public financing mechanisms for poor children. There are several ways this m ight be done. First and most obviously, the states m ight improve their Medicaid coverage significantly. Twenty states still do not extend benefits to all children under age 18 living in families with incomes below AFDC eligibility levels (table 2). All should do so. The Health Care Financing Administration has recently estimated that such a program m ight add 4 percent to a state's annual Medicaid outlays (Health Care Financing Administration 1984b) .
Fifteen states also currently fail to cover medically needy children (table 2). In 1981 Congress amended Medicaid to permit states to establish lim ited medically needy programs only for pregnant women and children under 18, without having to cover other categories of medically needy individuals, as required under prior law.""^ Medically needy coverage of pregnant women and children only has been estimated to add no more than 4 percent to a state's annual Medicaid outlays (W ulsin 1984) .
Most important, however, states should raise their AFDC payment levels. An AFD C increase would automatically increase Medicaid pen etration rates. A FD C payment increases are vital not only because they improve children's access to Medicaid but also because of the strong link between children's overall standard of living and child health outcomes (Starfield 1982) . In an era when the rate of progress in reducing infant mortality is declining and, even more important, the nation is experiencing an actual nationwide rise in postneonatal mortality, standard of living issues become particularly pressing (Chil dren's Defense Fund 1986b).
We recognize, however, that AFDC increases are not easy to ac complish. The nation's conservative retrenchment and the widespread misconception that welfare benefits led to the explosion during the 1970s of out-of-wedlock births to teenage women (even though, in fact, the value of welfare declined dramatically as the out-of-wedlock '^^Sect. 2171 of P.L. 97-35, replacing 42 U.S.C. sect. 1396a (a) (10) (C) ( 1980) . birthrate grew) mean that the stigm a of welfare is as strong today as it was 20 years ago.
Moreover, since by law M edicaid must be provided to anybody who receives A FD C , an A FD C increase means increased Medicaid coverage for adults as well as children and, therefore, a potential sizeable increase in M edicaid expenditures. Additionally, in states whose Medicaid plans include coverage of the medically needy, increased AFDC payments automatically push up medically needy eligibility standards, since A FD C serves as the basis for the states' medically needy eligibility levels. Many of these persons, including young adults, the elderly, and the disabled, have relatively high per capita costs (Health Care Financing Administration 1984b).
Thus, increasing M edicaid coverage by increasing AFDC may prove to be a politically and financially unpopular avenue for change. While state lawmakers m ight be persuaded to enact modest AFDC improve ments, they may resist sizeable across-the-board AFDC increases, es pecially in those states with medically needy programs.
Given the political and financial difficulties in substantially increasing coverage of children under Medicaid by improving the program's eligibility criteria, we believe that states should explore several other approaches. First, states m ight supplement Medicaid with a statefinanced public medical assistance entitlement or quasi-entitlement program for children whose family income falls between state AFDC payment levels and some outer lim it (for example, 125 percent of the federal poverty level). Children failing to qualify for or maintain Medicaid eligibility could be shifted onto coverage under this sup plemental public-insurance program. Moreover, such a program could develop a more reasonable asset test than the one employed under the AFDC program (although welfare officials estimate that less than 5 percent o f A FD C applicants are denied eligibility on the basis of excess resources).
A supplemental public-benefit health program for children makes both health and economic sense. Children who are stably insured could be enrolled over long periods of time with cost-effective providers, such as community health centers, HM O s, cost-efficient private group practices, or comprehensive public clinics. There is evidence that long term enrollment in a stable preventive and primary health care system may actually reduce overall Medicaid costs (Keller 1983) . Massachusetts has already established a supplemental public-benefit program for pregnant women with family incomes between that state's Medicaid eligibility level and 185 percent of the federal poverty level. This type of program could be extended to poor and near-poor children. Additionally, the Governors of Arizona and New Jersey have included such plans for children in their fiscal year 1987 budget proposals, and Maryland lawmakers are considering a similar type of plan for pregnant teenagers.
Alternatively, states m ight consider making more aggressive use o f their Medicaid flexibility more generously to finance public and quasi-public health care providers (such as community health centers) that are legally obligated to serve low-income children. Currently, many such clinical providers are poorly paid. Indeed, a number of state Medicaid programs fail to reimburse free-standing clinics for preventive, diagnostic, and treatment services rendered to Medicaid children unless the provider is a physician. These restrictive practices effectively give Medicaid agencies a " free ride" on the backs of health department clinics, community health centers, and other publicly obligated providers desperately in need of revenues to help offset their large caseloads of uninsured poor patients.
Instead of financially starving these providers, Medicaid agencies should include in their state plans coverage for all clinic services, not just those furnished by selected clinical staff. Reimbursement should be set on the basis o f clinics' reasonable charges for the comprehensive health care they provide. This higher level of Medicaid reimbursement could provide clinics with greater revenues, thereby enhancing their operations.
Third, states m ight provide direct grants to providers giving ambulatory services to large numbers of low-income children. Mas sachusetts, Connecticut, Texas, Florida, South Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, and New York all currently provide direct grants to one or more types of comprehensive clinics serving the poor. Were such supplementation combined with enhanced Medicaid reimbursement a more comprehensive public health system for low-income children m ight be developed.
In the long run, states m ight consider establishing a program to provide publicly subsidized insurance coverage for poor and near-poor working families. A number of states, including New York, South Carolina, Florida, and W est Virginia, have established revenue policy mechanisms for underwriting specific types of medical care, such as 4 7 5 hospital services for poor and uninsured persons. Revenues for these pools are collected from a variety of sources, including taxes on hospitals, insurers, other types o f taxes, and state and local contributions.
These pools might ultimately be used to underwrite a public insurance plan under which poor and near-poor families could buy coverage on an income-adjusted, sliding premium basis. Were such pooled money used simply to purchase private insurance for these families, problems might develop, since many private plans have poor coverage of preventive health benefits, utilize high coinsurance and deductibles, involve costly premiums, and provide coverage on an indemnity basis (which presents an impossible situation for low-income families, who cannot lay out cash first and collect from their insurer later). Publicly controlled plans would be less expensive to states and would permit states to control plan features. M assachusetts is currently considering such a plan.
We also strongly urge that a l l public child health financing mech anisms, whether M edicaid or supplemental public programs utilize EPSDT protocols. W hile remedying the basic financing dilemma is crucial, equally as important is the quality and content of the care that is purchased with public funds. EPSD T is an enduring articulation of sound medical practice, and its provisions should be adhered to, not undercut.
We hope that some day all child health financing mechanisms, whether public or private, will incorporate a complete EPSDT-level schedule of preventive and primary health benefits. Congress is now, in fact, considering legislation, known as the Child Health Incentive Reform Plan (C H IR P) which would require all employer-purchased health insurance plans to include coverage for certain preventive pediatric services such as health examinations and immunizations, in order to qualify for federal tax treatment. There is precedent for legislation imposing conditions on the deductibility of employer-financed coverage. Recently enacted federal legislation requires employers to extend coverage at group rates to families of deceased or divorced workers as a condition of tax deductibility. Furthermore, many states now mandate minimum benefits for insurance plans.
We are hopeful about the potential for reform. Policy makers are increasingly recognizing the need to come to grips with the health care financing gap that confronts low-income children. Indeed, the National Governors Association has recently recommended a major expansion of federal Medicaid eligibility requirements for low-income women and children, with financing to be shared by the federal government and the states. This organization's commitment to maternal and child health, in an era of major fiscal retrenchment at all levels of government, is remarkable.
W ithout doubt, reshaping the health care financing and service delivery system for low-income children is one of the most sophisticated tasks facing state and federal policy makers. But we believe that the task of reconciling child health goals with program realities is one that can be successfully undertaken with patience, inventiveness, and relatively modest outlays. 
